|Acquisition Program: ||Joint Improvised Explosives Devices Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), ACAT IV|
| ||RESTRICTION ON PERFORMANCE BY FOREIGN NATIONALS: This topic is “ITAR Restricted”. The information and materials provided pursuant to or resulting from this topic are restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which control the export of defense-related material and services, including the export of sensitive technical data. Foreign nationals may perform work under an award resulting from this topic only if they hold the “Permanent Resident Card”, or are designated as “Protected Individuals” as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3). If a proposal for this topic contains participation by a foreign national who is not in one of the above two categories, the proposal may be rejected.|| Objective: ||Development of predictive modeling and simulations tools that can be used to plan Improvised Explosives Devices (IED) countermeasures.
|| Description: ||IED activity, in Iraq alone, involves participation by a variety of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda cells, Iraqi Baath factions including Fedayeen Saddam, Sunni Islamists, and Pro-Iran Shia radicals. Globally, the number of such groups increases vastly. These terrorist groups are autonomous entities that, while united in the overarching goal of thwarting US interests, differ in their doctrinal interpretations, skills, resources, and strategies. While one faction may prefer suicide bombers, another faction might specialize in remotely triggered roadside bombs. Coordinated IED activity, involving joint operation by several of these groups, is particularly hard to predict and simulate. To devise effective countermeasures, predictive tools are needed to model and simulate the numerous potential combinations of coordinated IED attacks by these various groups. In addition to identifying the likely “coalitions” of these terrorist groups, the predictive tools should enable the planning of IED countermeasures.
One of the hurdles to the development of such predictive tools is the availability of historical data of sufficient quality and granularity. Data about past IED attacks is often scattered and not readily available in a form suitable for data mining. In addition, much of this data is sensitive and often classified. Proposed solution approaches should clearly state how this hurdle will be overcome. The sensitivity of the proposed predictive tools to data quality/availability should be addressed. Any assumptions about Government-Furnished Information (GFI) should be clearly documented and substantiated.
|| ||PHASE I: Propose and test the feasibility of the predictive approach for IED countermeasure modeling and simulation. The solution architecture including input data sources, the predictive model(s), and the output user-interface should be designed and tested.
|| ||PHASE II: The predictive tool will be implemented and demonstrated on realistic use-cases. Open-source intelligence data such as IED activity news reports can be used for Phase II demonstration. The developed software should be HLA-compliant to facilitate interaction with other relevant modeling and simulation tools.
|| ||PHASE III: Transition technology in coordination with the Navy counter-IED program and the broader Joint IED Defeat Organization. Other DoD counter-IED programs, such as the Combat Terrorism Technology Task Force (CT3F a.k.a “Team Tango”) are also transition paths for the predictive modeling tool. Homeland security and law enforcement applications are additional commercialization alternatives.
PRIVATE SECTOR COMMERCIAL POTENTIAL/|| ||DUAL-USE APPLICATIONS: Private sector commercial potential lies in the creation of IED predictive tools and techniques for delivery to the military and intelligence services of the United States and its allies.
|| References: ||1. ONR spearheads high-priority counter IED project, STARLINK Winter 2005/2006, http://www.nstarweb.com/enews/STARLINKWinter05_06.pdf
2. ONR funds basic science in support of counter-IED efforts, ONR media release, November 2005, http://www.onr.navy.mil/media/article.asp?ID=101
3. ONR BAA 05-024 http://www.onr.navy.mil/02/baa/docs/baa_05_024.pdf
4. Adaptive Foe Thwarts Counter-IED Efforts, National Defense, January 2006, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/jan/adaptive_foe.htm
5. DoD Taps Industry Know-How in Ongoing Counter-IED Efforts, American Forces Press Service, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/20060124_4000.html|
|Keywords: ||counter-IED; prediction; terrorist coalitions; modeling and simulation|